A Psyche of Trauma, Its Genesis and Perpetuation in Modern-Postmodern Space by Zhang, Kaiming Devin, \u2722
Furman Humanities Review 
Volume 32 August 2021 Article 7 
2021 
A Psyche of Trauma, Its Genesis and Perpetuation in Modern-
Postmodern Space 
Kaiming Devin Zhang '22 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarexchange.furman.edu/fhr 
 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Zhang, Kaiming Devin '22 (2021) "A Psyche of Trauma, Its Genesis and Perpetuation in Modern-
Postmodern Space," Furman Humanities Review: Vol. 32 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://scholarexchange.furman.edu/fhr/vol32/iss1/7 
This Article is made available online by Journals, part of the Furman University Scholar Exchange (FUSE). It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Furman Humanities Review by an authorized FUSE administrator. For terms of use, 
please refer to the FUSE Institutional Repository Guidelines. For more information, please contact 
scholarexchange@furman.edu. 
 
A PYSCHE OF TRAUMA, ITS GENESIS AND 





Devin Kaiming Zhang 
 
Any attempt to locate the whereabouts of it ends up 
like a dive into the foggy heart of an industrial city. Trying to 
grasp it by gazing at it? Futile attempt as it is, it does reward 
you with a picture: a picture of you, of what’s surrounding 
you, of what is not what you have in mind, that is the thing 
you are gazing at. It does not resist the effort of integration 
through comprehension, for how could one configure the be-
ing of an absence? Yet by its absence it gives you a distinct 
presence. The duplication of the surroundings is like a second 
degree simulation. You can navigate yourself simply by look-
ing at the mirror image of yourself. No, I am not talking about 
postmodernism yet, I am talking about a commercial plaza/of-
fice building in my hometown. It’s clad in a mirror whose sole 
purpose is to resist penetration, and to return the projectile 
gazes back to their owners. On one part of the building its re-
flective armor is shaped like waves, so as to achieve the cun-
ning artistry of seduction—it shows itself by a disruption on 
its surface, to make you feel the presence of something on a 
completely flat surface, yet in such discovery of an artificial 
presence, the surface of absence that gave birth to it became 
obsolete to the one who beholds. 
The resistance of penetration becomes contradictory 
when its porousness is revealed— the building has gates all 
around it. Entering it is waving-goodbye to the world outside, 
as I can still remember the moment I enter when it first opened 
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ever been to—a biome of its own making—yet not so different 
from a hundred shopping plazas I’ve been to, as a stepping into 
a structure like this is the reincarnation into a mechanical, fully 
automated womb of glass dome. The escalator that goes from 
the first floor directly to the fifth floor never stopped, and I can 
still feel myself becoming dizzy when, being the only fool on 
that escalator, I turned around and looked at the four floors 
beneath me. I became dizzy, and myself on the first floor 
waved at me, and I waved back from the fifth floor, with no 
way of going down since the escalator only goes up. I was then 
pushed along by the crowd that patrols around the floor like 
sentinel bots whose sole purpose is to interact with products 
neatly arranged throughout the floor. I felt like a platter of su-
shi on a conveyor belt, where the products in my eyes became 
the consumer and I became a product. This is the topic of this 
paper, on malls, or to be more exact, on the postmodernity in 
which a shopping mall becomes an epitome of its character. I 
seek to identify some phenomenal similarities between the 
postmodern philosophical trend, postmodern space, and 
trauma theory. I acknowledge my proposed method of inquiry 
could make me a target of accusation, for how could I expect 
anything plausible coming from my analysis without announc-
ing with confidence of my expertise and theoretical exertion, 
like an analyst to a patient, that these are your symptoms and 
here is your pill? Therefore let us reach a consensus before we 
proceed, that the goal of this paper is to send out an invitation, 
an invitation to think not hierarchically but horizontally, not 
foundationally but contextually, about the connection between 
trauma not as a disease inscribed in MDS-5 but as a discourse 
among common populace and what we now (often vulgarly 
and abusively) refer to as “postmodern.” 
A dissection of the paper into three parts becomes 
helpful when making sense of the issue at hand: a brief account 
of the affinities between trauma as a theoretical discourse and 
the philosophical shift from traditional metaphysics-focused 
tradition to the turn-of-the-language inspired trend. Following 




















François Lyotard as “metanarrative.” Then a study of post-
modern space will join the conclusions of the two sections be-
fore, at which the purpose of it will be to highlight how modern 
space is traumatic in itself, whereas postmodern space exhib-
its characteristics of post-traumatic experiences. All three 
sections serve well for the final dive into a comparative study 
of two novels Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close and The 
Crying of Lot 49, where we shall see how connections between 
the postmodern and trauma manifest themselves. The stylistic 
choice of this paper will also be altered from the traditional 
academic style, for to talk about trauma one must not illustrate 
with mere arguments and quotations, but perform and emulate 
the structure of trauma itself. The rejection of the academic 
style and the adoption of the literary and the poetic is essen-
tially the rejection of the metaphysical over the hermeneutics. 
The subversion of modern metaphysics-centered phi-
losophy is significant in the turn to language, in Saussure the 
signified and signifier became separate, allowing one to remi-
niscence the claim of nominalism—the pipe no longer sub-
stantiates what it refers to, that there is a gap between the sign, 
the symbolic, and the word “pipe” and the referent, the real, 
and the longish thing we use to smoke. It is a tradition that is 
post-Kantian in that the signifier and the signified resembles 
the relation between the noumena and the object-in-itself. This 
gap of meaning opens two possible routes to explore: the re-
sistance of knowing and the collapse of a modernist narratorial 
order. 
The results of the tendency in recent philosophical 
trend is especially notorious in the mutation of traditional phil-
osophical work into the writing of theories, which is a process 
this paper participates to a certain extent. What incurs its no-
toriety and its reputation is precisely the coherence with the 
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of any kind.”1 In France the mutation into post-structuralism 
starts with seekers of escape from the all encompassing Hege-
lianism, or, if we are to be bold enough to imply, an escape 
from what appears fatherly, a resistance of the Oedipus com-
plex. The infamous claim of Derrida “there is nothing outside 
of text” is almost trite due to its overuse. In a system of sign, 
“words depend on other words for their meaning, rather than 
on reference to some extra-linguistic reality.”2 Thus, even the 
concept of transcendence is only sensible when it is configured 
not as referring to anything outside the system of the sign but 
an immanent transcendence. The criticism of postmodern de-
construction—that it rejects the existence of truth which leads 
it to be self-defeating—is a misread, whereas the denial of 
transcendence as such is not a rejection of it—not that there is 
no transcendence, but what the transcendence is as such. And 
this resistance dances vis-a-vis to the legacy of enlightenment, 
the desire to know and to edify, and plays as an orchestra of 
heterogeneity contra to the solo instrument of “the urge to 
know … to convert otherness and difference into sameness,” 
a coherent narrative that excludes anything heterogeneous.3 
Henceforth this movement resists the analyst, the big-
ger end of an extending branch, and the first hundred sturdy 
bricks you lay at the base when build a house, what comes is 
“the ‘arborescent’ model of thought,” the stroll of a schizo, a 
self-referential, contextual system that need no exteriority to 
sustain the narratorial sensibility. It resists to be made sense 
solely through the act of seeing and laying claims on reason, 
since “vini, vidi, vici” , according to this frame of interpreta-
tion, is preceded by "vini, vidi, intellexi.” The act of seeing 
accompanied by the act of understanding, of witnessing being 
translated through a system of predetermined sign (signs that 
                                               
1 Paul Sheehan, “Postmodernism and Philosophy,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Postmodernism, ed. Steven Connor (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), pp.21. 
2 ibid, 23. 




















bear the marks of substantiation) into the qualification of mas-
tering, and of a history grasped through a consciousness that 
interprets by a frame of narrative, as if history is like a grape 
that can only grow if it climbs the rack of meaning, is the order 
being subverted and criticized in the postmodern. Similarly, 
the history of trauma seems to carry the same dynamic as the 
tug-o-war of interpretation—the inexact origin of trauma and 
the attempt of locating it and to territorialize  it through either 
psychoanalysis or modern psychological experiment resem-
bles the dynamics between a system of sign as nothing but a 
constellation of sign and the attempt to give them arbitrary 
meanings, to make sense of what inherently no sense through 
a creative process of naming—this longish thing is what we 
call pipe, these symptoms you experienced results from the 
physical shock you received in your spine when train crashed. 
The inability for trauma patients to provide a sensible 
account of where their symptoms originate from resembles a 
history out of touch with the possible methods of account. The 
basic philosophical inquiry “where am I from” finally be-
comes a strikingly demanding question when the event that 
causes trauma passes. The person who survived the train crash 
is left with a history that is not incorporated and a memory that 
is not entirely hers but nonetheless haunts her. In Cathy 
Caruth’s reading of the film Hiroshima mon amour, there is a 
clear resistance to the attempt of making sense of by seeing. 
When the woman mentions seeing the event of Hiroshima in a 
museum, the man denies the aboutness of her experience, 
which “suggests that the act of seeing, in the very establishing 
of a bodily referent, erases, like an empty grammar, the reality 
of an event.”4 The trauma erases itself when registered as his-
tory: “that happened to me a few decades ago/ I remember this 
city has been through from reading my history textbook.” 
What is known is solely the representation, whereas the origin 
of the simulated representation is no more, yet at the same time 
                                               
4 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History 
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exists as what cannot be grasped, something that haunts and 
cannot be articulated, since every articulation disperses the es-
sence of that trauma into the representational order of history. 
This is why for Caruth, there is “the necessary betrayal of the 
particular past in the understanding of a history,” since it is not 
the trauma itself being commemorated, but it can only be com-
memorated as history through a system of sign that does not 
belong to one's own.5 
To elucidate, a real historical example will serve the 
purpose well. On July 12, 2020, another earthquake happened 
in my hometown. The magnitude is 5.1, the circle of impact is 
about 10 kilometers. I try to collect information, including my 
mother’s account, who was at the time at the site of the event. 
I cannot feel anything, much like the time when I toured the 
earthquake museum in my city that was dedicated to preserve 
the memory of the earthquake in 1967, with the magnitude of 
7.8, and 244,000 casualties. I watched the documentaries, 
movies, and remains of that devastation. I comprehend, but I 
do not feel anything, except a ripple of empathy. Empathy for 
who? For the deceased? What is that which I witnessed? Is it 
the original trauma? A simulation of it? Or is it simply another 
story now I have to read? Was the museum tour any different 
from Middlemarch? Is it more real simply because there are 
collapsed pillars present? What if I donate some of my money 
for a Middlemarch museum? My experience of the museum 
tour resembles the experience of the woman in the film, which 
makes the contrast between an order of knowing and the lost 
origin stark. The moment of the earthquake is no more, and 
the moment of Hiroshima is no more. The genesis is only now 
preserved as a text that is open for seeing, but it is a represen-
tation of the genesis now that does not exist, a different type 
of real, a hyperreal of the genesis. The true moment of the 
trauma is not to be integrated into the consciousness, much 
like the earthquake sites preserved throughout the city, unable 
                                               




















to be made sense of by the generation born after the earth-
quake, nor can they be torn down and forgotten. The authen-
ticity of traumatic commemoration is an event that is forever 
lost due to the volatile essence of the event in relation to the 
attempt to articulate and to make sense of.  However this au-
thenticity is at the same time perpetually present because of its 
inability to be articulated and updated is forever present as 
something that cannot be articulated, catheterized, or compro-
mised—an absence. This is why Caruth claims that “a history 
can be grasped only in the very inaccessibility of its occur-
rence.”6 
The resistance of seeing and knowing implies the need 
of interpretation. Hermeneutics comes after the death of God 
and resultant disruption of clarity of meaning. Perhaps the 
death of God is not exact here. It is better to say the death of 
God as such. To claim God is such and such can no longer be 
registered as a metaphysical claim of God’s definitive 
aboutness, but the essence of such claim recedes to a symbol, 
an exclamation—doesn’t mean it is empty, but its aboutness 
changes from a definitive claim about the ontology of what we 
refer to as God to a claim that expresses one’s faith, of one’s 
belief in the system of possible references one find possible to 
choose from. It is not that I am “reducing” the claim “God is 
dead'' to a direct denial of the claim “God exists.” It is more 
like “the God that exists is not what denies other claims about 
the ontology of God once and for all, but to say that God is 
dead is, similarly, not to deny the claims about the ontology of 
God configured as existence.” God as absolute has died, and 
we now have to interpret and evaluate ourselves, just as the 
traceable origin of the site of trauma which repeats itself be-
comes invisible. To hand the interpretation back to the con-
sciousness self is what it does, so there is no excuse like “it is 
true because it is outside of the system of interpretation and 
signs as the absolute, as the objective,” but “it is true within 
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the system of signs, because of relevant inferences within the 
system that ultimately I have to interpret and decide.” 
In short, it signals the collapse of “metanarratives,” 
where, according to Lyotard, legitimacy of modernity turns 
into knowledge that “refines our sensitivity to differences and 
reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable.”7 At-
tempts of assigning any happenings to a narratorial order re-
sembles the attempt of making sense of trauma through artic-
ulation, either through making a witness possible, or by 
submitting oneself to a psychoanalysis or psychiatrist. How-
ever, the state of traumatic experience where no witness is pos-
sible resembles this refusal to be categorized and archived by 
language of others. To have one’s defensive shield breached 
beyond one’s ability to integrate it, to make sense of it, and to 
make past a paving stone of the present, is to lose one’s his-
tory, severed from the present. The barrier that is “a barrier of 
sensation and knowledge that protects the organism by placing 
stimulation within an ordered experience of time” lost its 
power to order and to organize stimulations in traumatic expe-
rience.8 The triumphing optimism of modernism that is con-
stantly in a fight to “break with tradition and to begin a new 
way of living and thinking” turned into “a manner of forget-
ting or repressing the past … of repeating it, [not] overcoming 
it.”9 The concrete “this is” and “thou shalt” turned into a pro-
cess of recurring hermeneutics. Differentiating in styles of nar-
rative from “working on time” in modernism to “working in 
time” of the postmodern, narratives became less of an event 
                                               
7 Jean-Francois Lyotard, “The Postmodern Condition,” in Literary Theory: 
an Anthology, ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Rya (Malden, Massachusetts: 
Wiley Blackwell, 2017), pp. 510. 
8 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 63. 
9 Jean-Francois Lyotard, “Defining the Postmodern,” in The Norton An-
thology of Theory and Criticism, ed. Vincent B. Leitch (New York, New 




















but more of a position.10 Where modernist interpretation at-
tempts to master the complexity of a narrative, postmodernism 
sees the complexity and the proliferation of text as “a promise 
or horizon to which art must try to live up.”11 
Overall, the collapse of witness in traumatized indi-
viduals who can no longer be the witness of their own trau-
matic event means a repetition due to inability to integrate, 
provided the witnessing from outside is not sufficient or does 
not measure up to the authenticity. The loss of witness is con-
tributed both by “the lack of responsiveness of bystanders … 
[and] the very circumstance of being inside the event.”12 In the 
meantime the postmodern condition in the collapse of tradi-
tional narratorial order implicates the need for references of an 
immanent order, a “self-knowing, self-referential system of 
discourse.”13 The parallel here is one between the death of a 
witness and the death of the author, between an inability to 
articulate, an origin lost, and the erasure of the importance of 
the traditional authority that contains the meaning and the in-




An origin forever lost calls for a recurring confronta-
tion with something strange and familiar, at same time “at 
home” and “uncanny.” To be haunted by an image that is lost 
is to give up the epistemological, since knowing is not to be 
achieved here through laying claims on the real. It is a point of 
no return, but perhaps the gap between the point of initiation 
                                               
10 Steven Connor, “Postmodernism and Literature,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Postmodernism, ed. Steven Connor (Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 63. 
11 ibid, 68-9. 
12 Cathy Caruth, Trauma: Explorations in Memory (Baltimore, Maryland: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp.66. 
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and the post order can be made more comprehensible when it 
is epochal? 
It is said the rapidly changing production method and 
the productive relation caused “all new-formed [methods and 
relations] become antiquated before they can ossify,” that is 
the case even if what a city feeds on is the ossification itself.14 
Fossils turn into coals, and people dig them up, burn them, ge-
ological accumulation turned into capital accumulation, and 
the enchanted earth now became the fertile soil for railroads 
and factories. The city where I am from is known for its central 
role in providing the nation with coal and steel before it is 
known for the earthquake. One of the first railroads in China 
was built here, and it became one of the first cities to modern-
ize. The city commemorates its dirt and sweat well, as the 
workers in coal mines and on railroads will sweat no more now 
that they have been framed and put in museums, far away from 
the city center where the monuments of the earthquake and 
shopping malls lie. Sanitization now exists in museums that 
preserve mining equipment as well, but after all they were still 
ostracized. The German family that first came here and con-
tributed a massive share to the development of the cement in-
dustry in the city now have their mansion turned into a mu-
seum, with bars and small restaurants surrounding it selling 
German craft beer. The good middle class consumers now can 
roam around the historical landmark while remaining a good 
and safe distance from the real cement business, while drink-
ing a craft beer gazing at the representation of the heavy, the 
sweaty, and perhaps the dirty. What happened? Yet one thing 
is for certain, that no matter what happens, it is a constitu-
tional, quintessential change in the structure of representa-
tional and spectacular order. 
Modernity, if not anything else, captures the motion 
of accumulation perfectly. The surplus being used as invest-
ment for a new batch of productive capital, the growth of 
                                               
14 Karl Marx, The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York, 




















profit, the rapidity of  transportation, the growth of skyscrap-
ers, the rising smoke of London smog of Victorian era, the 
roaring 20s, the pop art, and the overwhelming amount of sen-
sory input that exceeds one’s capacity to process are all part of 
the modern scheme, the motifs that epitomizes the modernity, 
the order of an utopian vision, the positivity that comes with 
positivism. It is this same motion of accumulation that set the 
definitive character of lyric poetry in Walter Benjamin, the 
shock that would be the central productive and creative force 
of poetry, and it would “sterilize this incident for poetic expe-
rience” when “it were incorporated directly in the registry of 
conscious memory.”15 In a sense, the shock experienced by 
lyric poets is to be the libido of poetry creation only when it is 
not integrated into consciousness, only when it is represented 
as mémoire involuntaire. The question, then, is what kind of 
literature can be created through such a process? 
The question is essentially a question of what shocked 
the poet and how the poet shocked. For the first question I 
would like to suggest these factors as exemplary samples of 
study: 1. Public transportation in cities; 2. The mass in the city, 
the moving crowd; 3. The factories, the industrial landscape 
that characterized modernity; 4. The mode of repetition, for 
example, standardization of production and reproduction of 
artworks. 
The action of parrying shocks assaulting one from all 
directions is not a privileged activity reserved specially for 
lyric poets. The case is for any city. For transportations, I got 
hit by cars twice, fell on the pavement countless times, and ran 
into someone a dozen times when riding an electric bike in my 
hometown, an upgraded version of the good old modern in-
vention that serves as a flaneur’s mount. I rode with little cau-
tion, for I know nothing will prevent me from being hit by 
something today. Either a car will run into me because it 
crossed a red light at the wrong moment or I will run into a car 
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because I am trying to bypass an area of traffic jam. I have my 
headphones on all the time, not because I am trying to get my-
self in an accident, but because I can actually focus better with 
headphones on, for I will be less paranoid from all the honking 
coming from all around me. 
The crowd goes well with public conveyance like ba-
con with eggs. It is characteristic of Benjamin’s observation, 
which is that “[the] interpersonal relationships of people in big 
cities are characterized by a markedly greater emphasis on the 
use of the eyes than on that of the ears.”16 You don’t wish to 
be blind in a city, for you will run into people all the time, or 
perhaps fall into a manhole due to the poor urban planning. 
You do not listen attentively for the sound of the bus that has 
its wheels rubbing on the ground from a far distance, you look 
out for the bus that is coming for you with the impatient driver 
on his third shift. You cannot let your eyes off for one second 
if you are navigating in a jungle of concrete. You will need 
good eyes to make up for the ears obfuscated by the cars hum-
ming their engines around, by people talking, by music played 
in stores, etc. This awkward position does not end with being 
a pedestrian or a bike rider exposed outside. It is more marked 
for people who are enclosed in public transportations like 
trains and buses. Those make up a position where one has to 
“stare at one another for minutes or even hours on end without 
exchanging a word.”17 In subways, buses, especially during 
commute hours, one feels like a sardine in a can, or like a per-
son trapped under a collapsed architecture under an earth-
quake. One is not only jostled by the elbows and feet of other 
sardines, but the transportation itself is constantly jostling and 
shaking, moving at an incredibly high speed that doesn’t allow 
one to fully absorb what is happening to her experience, and 
one can only operate on an instinctual note. 
                                               





















Amongst the interwoven web of a massively complex 
transportation system filled with numerous heads, one is sub-
jected to a continuing flow of loss. To see a car pass by with 
flashing speed, to see people getting on and off on a bus, to be 
with others in a hermetically sealed place like subway or train, 
only to bid them farewell the very next second, all contribute 
to a sense of constant loss that is different from the traditional 
“travel from this village to the other on a slow cart or carriage” 
experience. The coincidence with trauma here is one of con-
stant bereavement, where the visage, the locus of establishing 
an ethical and personal relation, is always in a state of afterim-
age, because there is no capturing one’s image unless you ded-
icate yourself to a career of professional stalker. This bereave-
ment is “a farewell forever which coincides in [Baudelaire’s] 
poem with the moment of enchantment.”18 The “agitated veil” 
of crowd through which Baudelaire sees Paris is common to 
all city dwellers, which consists of imposed activities like be-
ing pushed around, or spotting a visage in a surging tide of 
crowd, only to have it lost and replaced by a new face new 
second. The experience in a modern city is therefore traumatic 
in the sense that one experiences a physical dizziness from 
transportation and a psychical dizziness, a recurring loss, 
when being placed in a crowd that is constantly moving with-
out its own telos. 
“He becomes an appendage of the machine.”19 Is it a 
passage referring to Chaplin’s movie Modern Times? Chrono-
logically speaking, no. Formally speaking? Yes. The proletar-
ian condition told by Marx has become the collective experi-
ence of the modern era. Like works when the industrial 
revolution first ignited its engine, the subjugation to a machine 
rhyme became more and more prevalent. For young and old 
alike, “technology has subjected the human sensorium to a 
                                               
18 ibid, 169. 
19 Karl Marx, The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York, 
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complex kind of training.”20 The mortar shells and the motor 
engines are both the contraptions of industry that collared 
around us and gave us a new sensation of time. A machine 
time. We no longer move with our volition, the clash between 
traditional craftsman model of industry hence forms a sheer 
contrast with the mode of calculation in wage labour. Lyo-
tard’s observation of technology is more than fitting: “[tech-
nologies] doesn’t respond to a demand coming from human 
needs. On the contrary, human entities (individual or social) 
seem always to be destabilized by the results of this develop-
ment.”21 The human subject, henceforth is rendered incapable 
of processing the stimuli, incapable of integrating the rapidly 
revolutionizing experience and capital models, and a perma-
nent sense of loss attributes to this sense of unintergrability. 
Repetition is a central pattern for both modernism and 
trauma. The assembly line renders the mass production possi-
ble through a series of adaptations to machine time, and tech-
nologies like photography and film allowed the affordable rep-
lication of artworks that were confined only to a specific group 
of people before. In short, what we witness in the process of 
reproduction of the artwork, according to Benjamin, is the loss 
of the aura, the immediacy and authenticity of the artwork. 
Moreover, just as in the traumatic repetition, where “the repe-
tition of the traumatic experience in the flashback can itself be 
retraumatizing,” the reproductive order of the artwork takes on 
meaning on its own.22 “The work reproduced becomes the re-
production of a work designed for reproducibility,” just as the 
repeated traumatic experience becomes trauma in itself.23 The 
modern invention and reorganization of productive relations 
                                               
20 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, 175. 
21 Jean-Francois Lyotard, “Defining the Postmodern”, 1387. 
22  Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 65. 
23 Benjamin, Walter. “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological 
Reproducibility.” In The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, ed. 
Vincent B. Leitch (New York, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 




















provides repetition of traumatic experiences. Such is essen-
tially the modern sensation experienced by Baudelaire: “the 
disintegration of the aura in the experience of shock.”24 Repro-
duction of films, one of the most prominent modern art form, 
marks the height of such transition from aura infused art into 
the order of pure reproduction where the first paragraph of 
Debord’s Society of Spectacle perfectly captures: “[every-
thing] that was directly lived has moved away into a represen-
tation.”25 The shattered graphics in Debord’s Mémoires can be 
read as a shocked psyche traversing in the highly modernized 
cities. However, if we stop at the reading of Debord, we stop 
at the height of modernity. Its continuation, however, is in 
Baudrillard, and a movement from trauma eliciting modernity 
to trauma-sustaining or trapped in trauma postmodern land-
scape is made possible. 
The reading of postmodern landscape will be accom-
panied by two texts, Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close and 
The Crying of Lot 49, with structural similarity about the pro-
tagonist traversing through a cityscape in search of a sign that 
(arbitrarily) relates to one deceased. 
What, then, are the two protagonists searching? Per-
haps what is not the relevant question here, for it is, like all 
signs, heavily laden with an unarticulated proposition, that 
there is something that they are searching that is real. And by 
real here, again, I do not mean real as the opposition of false, 
but real as the “above” of a designated “false”. Therefore, the 
question of Oskar—“if you don’t tell me anything how can I 
ever be right”—is to be rephrased into “how could [he] ever 
be wrong.”26 And Oedipa’s question “shall I project a world” 
is no longer a question as her “projection” became highly sim-
ulated that the readers are forced to participate in her alleged 
                                               
24 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, 194. 
25 Guy Debord, The Society of Spectacle (Detroit, Michigan: Black & Red, 
2018), pp.1. 
26 Jonathan Safran Foer, Extremely Loud & Incredibly Close (London: 
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paranoia.27 The reader has to linger from “is he/she mentally 
abnormal” to a full involvement of the narrative of a finally 
made-reasonable tale, which is perhaps the only possible 
structural equilibrium one could possibly locate and achieve—
not in the text, but in the reader herself. 
 Since the inquiry about the “realness” of their 
experience was delegitimized, the two novels share the same 
textual performance in presenting a “‘flat’ network of areas of 
inquiry,” in which “the respective frontiers of which are in 
constant flux.”28 Different from a plot of a classical bildungs-
roman novel, I would argue, no real “growth” has been pre-
sented in both novels in regard to the psyche of the protago-
nists. For Oedipa, she is physically active, moving through 
different spots and through different people in search of the 
truth of the post horn symbol she perceives to have signifi-
cance, but all her actions are predetermined. She does not 
bring changes to anyone she had a conversation with, but her 
role is not passive in the traditional sense. As for Oskar, all his 
activeness are rewarded only with a fantasy, an untied knot—
the letters he sent, the play in which he is involved with, and 
the final scene of digging up his father’s coffin. In short, their 
stories “appear to have a progressive aim, but in reality they 
have always ‘been achieved’.”29 Perhaps it is in this sense that 
their actions are simulated, in the sense that all the narratives 
about their stories weave into a coherent narrative within the 
confinement of self-referential motion without ever going be-
yond that: “the will to change is simply all-pervasive. The 
question is whether that change has a common goal (a modern 
telos) or merely exists for change itself.”30 
                                               
27 Thomas Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49 (New York, New York: Peren-
nial, 1986), pp.64. 
28 Jean-Francois Lyotard, “The Postmodern Condition,”510-11. 
29 Richard J. Lane, Jean Baudrillard (London: Routledge, 2009), pp.113. 




















This change for changes sake in the two novels coin-
cide with the fantasy of Oedipa and Oskar, not fantasy in a 
Freudian sense, where the fantasy for an object or a scenario 
unravels the unconscious desire, but fantasy as the basic con-
stituent of one’s selfhood. What the two novels did par excel-
lence to other narratives that are about the other trauma narra-
tives is that it achieves the goal of highlighting the repetition 
of trauma through a gesture that points to the broken-down of 
psychoanalytic authority. A disintegration of the organizing 
force, of the epistemological imposition from hierarchy of a 
set of cultural values is required to bring about the complete 
collapse of any outsiderness. For Oedipa, singing this trope 
with a higher pitch, we witnessed her psyche going to the 
limit—“the act of metaphor then was a thrust at truth and a lie, 
depending where you were: inside, safe, or outside, lost”—and 
topped with a return of a memoire involuntaire of her college 
years, which is a frequent intrusion that was never fully ex-
plained.31 In her frenzy she bent down her proud self-legislat-
ing force, changing from her uncompromisable resoluteness 
against the want of her subjugation to the authority, the lack 
articulated by Dr. Hilarius at the beginning of the novel, to a 
clear expression of a desire: “she wanted it all to be fantasy … 
She wanted Hilarius to tell her she was some kind of a nut and 
needed a rest.”32 A defeated schizo, in search of a legislative 
force, went for a psychiatrist. This is where, normally in a bild-
ungsroman novel, our heroine receives her transition towards 
the other end of equilibrium, where she becomes a socially re-
sponsible woman capable of making the right decision. How-
ever, what we witnessed instead is a breakdown of the psychi-
atrist himself: Dr.Hilarius has gone mad due to paranoia. And 
a curious turning point is when Dr.Hilarius confessed his past 
and his subscribing to Freudian theory has a remedial mo-
                                               
31  Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49, 105. 
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tive—because Freud is a Jew. It is reasonable to give the hy-
pothesis that Dr.Hilarius is experiencing something similar to 
survivors guilt, but what is more amusing is that here it is Oe-
dipa who takes up the role of legislating and becomes the lis-
tener behind the leathered couch. She even advised Hilarius to 
“[face] up to your social responsibilities [and accept] the real-
ity principle.”33 Yet this is not a simple reversal of the role, not 
a simple reversal of the master-slave dialectics, but an attempt 
to break the limit appears when Oedipa confessed to Dr.Hilar-
ius that she seeks the expertise of Dr.Hilarius as a Freudian to 
dispel her search, what has constituted her character and mean-
ing so far, as a mere fantasy. The reply she got from Hilarius 
is to cherish her fantasies, for, he questioned “[what] else do 
any of you have” and proceeds to dismiss the psychoanalytic 
scheme that which constitutes his identity as a healer and Oe-
dipa’s identity as a patient: “don’t let the Freudians coax it 
away or the pharmacists poison it out of you … when you lose 
it you go over by that much to the others. You begin to cease 
to be.”34 A former fascist, Dr.Hilarius probably precedes the 
first English translation of Anti-Oedipus by 11 years. He and 
Oedipa thus sees the articulation of psychoanalysis that “if de-
sire is the lack of the real object, its very nature as a real entity 
depends upon an ‘essence of lack’ that produces the fantasized 
object” and denied its legitimacy.35 For them, fantasy is not a 
representation of the lack of the real, but what one ought to 
cherish, as it forms a flat surface, a contextually coherent sys-
tem on one’s own account without any referential force to-
wards outside—self sufficient.  
The same goes for Oskar, when he resists the scheme 
and questions the rule of the psychiatrist who tries to find 
proof to prove him a PTSD victim. But what’s more important 
                                               
33 ibid, 111. 
34   Pynchons, The Crying of Lot 49, 113. 
35 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schiz-




















is the role of fantasy in the narrative of Oskar. It seems where 
the ego of Oskar really resides is in his so-called fantasies. 
First, his searching of the lock and the connection making and 
clue searching is essentially a search for meaning in a mean-
ingless landscape. Second, the novel essentially ends with a 
fantasy where Oskar imagines his father will be safe. What is 
genius about it is that it invites the readers to participate in 
Oskar's fantasy, not as an authority that judges whether he is 
in fantasy or not, but as part of Oskar, or as Oskar. The re-
versed flipping image of the person falling off the twin tower 
ensures the endless repetition of it since by going backwards 
one needs to go forwards first—especially for equipment like 
cassettes. Oskar refuses to go through a mirror stage and iden-
tifies with what he sees. In his book that records things that 
happened to me images of keys, Steven Hawking, turtles, ge-
ometric shapes, etc are present. How did this happen to him? 
Perhaps it is only sensible to Oskar. Thirdly, the image in Os-
kar’s book of Hamlet holding the skull of Yorick is intriguing 
because one may guess that Oskar is identifying with the skull, 
but who could say for sure? In his school play, Oskar plays the 
role of Yorick, the skull of a jester where Hamlet gazes and 
interacts with as a passive object. Oskar’s part is no part at all, 
he’s been erased from the play. His absence is simulated by 
the all black costume and his papier-mâché skull, in order to 
“give the illusion that you don’t have a body.”36 In fact, the 
illusion given is not that Oskar doesn’t have a body, but simply 
that there is no Oskar. The sweet coax of the teacher given, 
that Oskar may steal the show if he plays anyone else, is shat-
tered in the fantasy. In Oskar’s fantasy on stage, he becomes 
no longer the passive skull who is being gazed at and is being 
known by the active Hamlet and Horatio, but it takes on a force 
of itself. No longer being subjugated and legislated by the gaze 
of Hamlet, Oskar announces Hamlet’s fate by diagnosing him 
with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, which is in fact the disease 
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that has been tormenting Steven Hawking, whom Oskar ad-
mired. If this scene was a simple reversal of  the role of the 
subjugated dead skull and the living, active, neurotic, and Oe-
dipal Hamlet, it would be less charming to read this scene over 
and over again. What we witness is not a simple reversal in 
Oskar’s reverie, nor simply a fantasy about revenging the 
bully,  but a making sense, an identification with his fantasy, 
with his flat surface, which means an identification with his 
repetition of trauma. When he smashed the skull which ob-
scures him and denies his existence against the head of Jimmy, 
the skull became the head of everyone he knows, the dead be-
came everyone, implying the recognition of the ubiquitous 
fear, of the feeling that “the hostage [,which is the victim] is 
unnameable, anonymous, a kind of ghost who temporarily 
haunts the imagination.”37 Is Oskar invoking universal annihi-
lation? Is he repeating his trauma? We cannot conclude. But 
what we can conclude is that by announcing “DAD doesn’t 
make sense. MOM doesn’t make sense. THE AUDIENCE 
doesn’t make sense,” and that the only thing that makes sense 
in the fantasy of Oskar is “[his] smashing JIMMY SNYDER’s 
face,” and that in this young boy’s fantasy he made sense, for 
“THE AUDIENCE is applauding, all of them, because [he is] 
making so much sense.”38 Like Oedipa, the refusal to cope 
through the imposition of a narrative allows Oskar to not iden-
tify with fantasy, because calling something fantasy doesn’t 
make sense when the object designated as the locus of fantasy 
is denied. And as the reality fades, Oedipa and Oskar are able 
to repeat their trauma endlessly without confronting an over-
riding narrative of “accepting reality.” It is a world-shaping 
that makes one’s world into a Klein bottle, where all the dif-
ference between outsiderness and insideness vanishes, and one 
is left with an endless repetition of an immanent nature. Such 
is a trauma narrative without trauma. 
                                               
37ibid, 103. 
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